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Abstract 
The  existence  of  legal  constants  does  not  preclude  the  process  of  legal  change,  of  its 
permanent evolution. Thus, the legal doctrine emphasizes that there is no legislation valid for all 
times,  the  legal  progress  mentioned  by  Turgot  being  ubiquitous.  Multiple  forces  drive  to 
diversification or to approach the national legal systems. Analysing the history of law, we distinguish 
the existence of overlapping legal systems, fact that raises the question of legal typologies. Different 
criteria and different names have been proposed by the legal comparatists. In the present study, we 
shall address some of the most important and famous criteria, with emphasis on a new legal typology 
that has arisen - the European Union law. 
The  present  study  is  part  of  a  more  complex  research  on  this  theme  and  it  is  meant  to 
approach certain important points of my Ph.D. thesis. 
Keywords:  comparative  law,  diversification,  European  Union,  legal  systems, 
typology. 
I. Introduction 
Conceived as a multidisciplinary study combining elements of general theory of law, 
with elements of comparative law and European Union law, this paper aims to answer the 
questions: what are the legal typologies and is the EU law a new type of law, with specific 
qualitative determinations?  
We are currently witnessing exciting challenges concerning the European Union  – 
there are discussions about the integration in a legal order above the Member States legal 
order,  about  connecting  supranational  interests,  about  the  reconfiguration  of  sovereignty, 
about  the  intertwining  of  national  values  with  the  European  Union  and  about  the 
harmonization of legislation.  
Thus, we ask ourselves if the European Union law, characterized by multilingualism 
and multijuridism, can be considered a new type of law, emerged in the panorama of the 
world’s legal systems? We believe that, just as far as the EU is based on an autonomous legal 
will  and  on  principles  and  values  that  are  within  the  eternal  law,  “unity  in  diversity”  is 
possible and so the existence of a new legal family.  
In law, because the legislator cannot  exhaust  all legal  situations  that may  arise in 
society and that have to be regulated, he selects certain current types out of the diversity of 
possible  relationships,  excluding  the  others.  Using  simplification  methods,  the  legislator 
chooses sometimes typification, and other times classification. 
The typological or typological-classificatory method is used from ancient times by 
legal sciences (e.g. from Roman law we find out about the type of pater familias). In general, 
legal typologies are used in law by considering the real elements and relationships in legal life 
in  order  to  know  more  precisely  what  mechanisms  or  structural  relationships  have  been 
established in a range of legal issues
1. 
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We consider that typologies involve the analysis of typical features between different 
types of objects, phenomena, processes and people. However, any typology face a particular 
problem – the selection of the criteria underlying the classification of the phenomena studied. 
Because the typology represents a partial synthesis, the social sciences use very often the 
typological method, providing valuable results.  
II. Paper Content 
Humans are social beings, but they are also juridical beings - homo juridicus, who, 
wishing to regulate and develop the human society, understood that it is necessary to create 
the law. Equipped with consciousness and will, humans act in order to meet their needs and 
interests, whether by respecting their values protected by law, whether by breaking them. 
Law is conditioned by time and space, and its history is lost in the mist of time. Thus, 
using the historical method of legal phenomenon research, we find out that law appeared in 
the  Ancient  East.  We  note  here  the  cosmogenetic  conception  that  encompasses  several 
philosophical ideas crystallized in China and Ancient Greece, ideas which constitute the basis 
of law. 
An  impressive  feature  of  the  entire  universe  is  diversity.  Like  there  are  not  two 
snowflakes alike, two leaves alike, two trees alike, two people alike, two souls alike, there are 
not two legal systems alike. But having no unity around us, can we dream of knowing the law 
of other societies? 
Law is connected to the social environment, being influenced by various legal and 
extra-legal  factors.  Because  of  this  connection,  the  law  evolves  with  the  society,  and  as 
Ihering said, law is not always and everywhere the same. But people do not live isolated. 
Since ancient times, they felt the need to gather in communities. Today more than ever, in this 
globalized world, people come in contact with each other. This requires an understanding of 
the rules governing legal systems. It requires a common understanding of people’s rights and 
obligations. This thirst for knowledge is watered by the science of comparative law, which 
explains  the  institutions  and  legal  concepts  in  the  context  in  which  it  occurs,  in  their 
dynamics, analysing the concrete social conditions in which they arise. 
The existence of legal constants changes law, its permanent evolution. Thus, there can 
be  no  legislation  which  would  be  valid  for  all  times,  because  in  the  natural  process  of 
becoming law the legal progress, that Turgot was mentioning about, intervenes.  
Multiple forces drive diversification or the closeness of the national rights. Some of 
these  forces  are  not  legal  (e.g.  geography  of  the  respective  states,  religion,  politics, 
economics, language). Others are legal because even the law can be “an accelerator of its own 
diversity”. The comparatists do not just try to establish the existence of these forces, but they 
try to group them into systems. 
Analysing  the  history  of  law,  we  distinguish  the  existence  of  overlapping  legal 
systems, fact that raises the question of legal typologies. As I have underlined above, the 
typological method is widely used in the social sciences (especially in law), and it supposes 
“not considering individual differences insignificant for the given goal, since any typology is 
subject  to  some  research  purposes,  especially  in  terms  of  establishing  uniformity  and 
explanatory value”
2. 
In order to group the national legal systems, task of the comparative law, different 
criteria were used and different names were proposed.  
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The first legal classifications were based on the genetic criteria: natural-ethnological, 
cultural, legislative, legal-genetic. These genetic criteria fell into two streams: genetic-racial 
and genetic-historical.  
From the genetic-racial stream, we mention the legal orders typologies by Adh￩mar 
Esmein and James Bryce. At the beginning of the last century, Adh￩mar Esmein proposed, 
with great accuracy, the need to classify the laws of different nations “by reducing them to a 
small number of families and groups, each of them representing an original legal system”
3: 
the Latin group (France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania and the Latin Republics of 
Central  and  Southern  America),  the  German  group  (the  Scandinavian  nations,  Austria, 
Cisleithania
4, Hungary), the Anglo-Saxon group (England, the United States of America and 
the English-speaking colonies), the Slavic group, the Muslim law group.  
As regards the typology of legal orders proposed by James Bryce, we emphasize that 
he was discussing about the Teutonic, Roman, Hindu, Mohammedan legal orders. 
For a long time, the racial-genetic stream has been vexed because this criterion was 
doomed to failure, the concept of race being uncertain and imperceptible.  
As regards the genetic-historical stream, we note that some comparatists noticed the 
importance of history in determining the legal orders. Before 1880, Ernest Glasson classified 
the legal systems from this point of view, revealing three types of legislation: one in which 
the  Roman  law  prevails  (Romania,  Portugal,  Italy,  Spain,  Greece),  one  in  which  the 
customary law prevails (England, Russia, Scandinavia) and one in which the Roman element 
merged with the barbaric element (France, Switzerland, Germany). 
This classification has been criticized for incompleteness and inaccuracy, its author 
only making a micro-comparative study at Europe’s level. The classifications of Nobushige 
Hozumi, Bevilaqua and Martinez-Paz come also under this category. Enrique Martinez-Paz’s 
classification is interesting because it improves Glasson’s classification, distinguishing: the 
customary-barbaric group (English law, Swedish law, Norwegian law), the barbaric-Roman 
group  (German  law,  French  law,  Austrian  law),  the  barbaric-Roman-canonical  group 
(Portuguese law, Spanish law) and the Roman-canonical-democratic group (Latin American 
countries  law,  Switzerland,  Russia).  This  work  is  also  criticized  for  the  same  reasons  as 
Glasson’s  theory  especially  that  classifying  the  Russian  law  as  democratic  in  1934  is 
unbelievable.  
At  the  end  of  the  genetic  stream,  classifications  designed  by  L￩vy-Ullmann  and 
Sarfatti  appear,  which  focus  on  the  encoded,  religious  or  customary  character  of  legal 
systems. Although superficial, these classifications predict the typological method. 
There were also modern attempts to classify, as Leontin-Jean Constantinesco called 
them, among which: the Arminjon-Nolde-Wolfe classification (distinguishing seven families 
of legal systems: French, German, Scandinavian, English, Islamic, Hindu, Soviet), Grisolia’s 
classification  contesting  Arminjon-Nolde-Wolfe  classification  (distinguishing  five  legal 
systems: the codified, the Anglo-American, the religious, the socialist), the Spanish doctrine 
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classifications (Sola Canizares’s classification, Eichler’s classification, and Jos￩ Maria Castan 
Vazquez’s classification). 
After the Second World War, the comparatists abandoned the historical criteria and 
search  criteria  among  the  typological  elements.  It  is  interesting  what  Leontin-Jean 
Constantinesco  underlines  as  being  characteristic  at  the  beginnings  of  the  typological 
classification:  “the  classification  proposed  by  an  author  is  rejected  by  the  objections  of 
another author”
5, without any scientific dialogue. “The merit of the comparatists who were 
part of this new stream is to have grouped legal orders in systems, not because they were 
genetically,  genealogically  or  historically  related,  but  because  they  presented  common 
typological structures”
6.  
The best known comparatist falling under this stream is Ren￩ David, who noted that, 
like religions, legal systems can be reduced to a few fundamental types. He used two criteria 
in order to determine the affinity or the typological mismatch: the ideological point of view 
and the technical point of view. 
As regards the ideological point of view, David said that “legal systems oppose each 
other because they express different conceptions about justice, which relate, of course, with 
all factors organizing the respective society; legal systems distinguish between them because 
the communities to which they apply maintain different religious or philosophical beliefs or 
because they have different  political,  economic or social  structures  (...) the legal  systems 
oppose  each  other,  even  when  they  reflect  the  same  conception  of  what  is  just,  by  the 
technique developed by their lawyers and that they use to make this conception triumph”
7. It 
is evident that even this typology can be criticized. 
The panoramic analysis of legal systems did not stop at Ren￩ David, existing other 
classifications  according  to  the  style  theory  (Konrad  Zweigert)  based  on  cultural  and 
ideological element (Silva Pereira’s classification, Castan Tobenas’s classification), according 
to  the  Marxist  doctrine  (although  a  general  reluctance  of  Soviet  lawyers  towards  the 
comparison can be observed). 
Thus,  in  time,  lawyers  have  attempted  to  classify  these  types  of  law,  taking  into 
account the law content and the specific features of the means of expression of this content, 
but  also  some  criteria  such  as  the  dependency  of  social  organization  systems  typology 
(criterion proposed by Poirier) or the affiliation to a legal civilization pool (criterion proposed 
by David). It is interesting that the terminology used to represent the group result of national 
legal systems is: great legal systems, legal families, legal types. 
All the classifications mentioned above show that the legal systems typology is not 
entirely solved. Why? As Leontin-Jean Constantinesco pointed out, “[t]he first thing that hits 
you when  you deal with this problem is the dilettantism, superficial analysis or even the 
absence of any scientific examination of the matter. Comparatists who addressed this matter 
seem rather keen to demonstrate the flaws criteria proposed by other authors, being eager to 
propose their own classification, which does not really worth more”
8. 
There are several reasons we mention here: the lack of a serious examination of the 
issue regarding the legal systems classification, the fields examined in order to make groups 
were not determining, any partial and unfounded classification is necessarily false, the spread 
of civil codes in the world cannot represent a classification criterion, the heterogeneity of the 
proposed criteria. One of the most important reasons is the inability to provide the criteria 
necessary  to  the  micro-comparison  classification  (eventually  only  micro-results  could  be 
obtained!), the macro-comparison being necessary. 
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Over time, there have been various attempts to define and classify legal systems, with 
existing various criteria, out of which the most important: the dependence on systems of 
social organization, the affiliation to a legal civilization pool, the role of law as means of 
social organization. We shall further length these three criteria. 
The colourful words of Leontin-Jean Constantinesco come back to our mind: “[t]o 
develop legal systems means to know and to have conscience of the exact position of the legal 
systems in the legal universe. This means, simultaneously, to exit the legal national ghetto and 
to understand that national legal systems, linked by their determined elements derived of other 
legal systems, form larger assemblies”
9. 
A. The legal typology based on the dependence of social organization systems 
(Poirier) 
Using  the  typological  method  and  this  criterion,  the  famous  analyst  Jean  Poirier 
ascertains the historically overlapping legal systems (historical legal types): slave law, feudal 
law, bourgeois law, socialist law.  
It is interesting to note that although these types of law present specific features in the 
content of fundamental institutions, legal constructions or in share of sources, “such typology 
does not cancel the specific differences of the various individual systems coexisting in the 
same historic space”
10. 
The slave law had as major objectives “to defend the property of the slave owners and 
the exclusion of slaves from the category of the persons and their location in the one of 
things”
11. Roman law is part of this category. But there were also differences, such as the 
province of Dacia which received the Roman law, and where there were observed features of 
the acquisition of property, marriage and kinship. 
The feudal law defended the land ownership, its legal rules being designed to prevent 
the division of large estates, the primogeniture rule playing an important role.  
The bourgeois law proclaimed human rights (e.g. freedom of the individual, equality 
of citizens). 
The socialist law arose through reception of the Soviet law in states with a political 
system  like  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  (USSR).  Based  on  dialectical  and 
historical materialism, such legal system considered the entire legal order as public law. In the 
countries that had adopted this legal system, the economy was centralized, the commercial 
law being virtually non-existent,  and the purpose of law being distorted, because politics 
could ever taint the law application by calling frequently “to the law and regulation, especially 
in critical situations of social system functionality, forcing the law to be what it cannot be - a 
panacea”
12. 
However, “[t]he events occurred in 1989 in the countries of Eastern Europe, which left 
the  Soviet  model  of  development,  the  collapse  of  the  totalitarian  system,  drove  to  the 
atomization of the ﾫgreat socialist legal systemﾻ to powder, the reminded states turning back 
to their traditional principles, attached to the great Romano-Germanic legal system”
 13. 
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B. The legal typology based on the affiliation to a legal civilization pool (David) 
In the legal doctrine, Ren￩ David is considered as being “certainly the comparatist 
who has devoted the greater part of his work to the description of the legal systems and, thus 
to the classification of legal systems”
14, his analysis being the most comprehensive. 
The criterion of law affiliation to a legal civilisation pool determined the comparatists 
to acknowledge the existence of legal families, which differentiate through legal language, 
legal concepts, legal institutions and philosophical features; therefore, Ren￩ David retains the 
following legal families (which represent the major contemporary legal systems): Roman-
Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, socialist, Muslim, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese (the Far East) and black 
Africa and Madagascar. 
The development of legal systems in Europe and in the British Isles took place in 
parallel for several centuries, creating two different legal environments.  
The Roman-Germanic family or legal system (the civil law) is the result of reception of 
Roman law in the XIV-XV centuries; it integrates the Italian legal system, the French legal 
system  and  the  related  national  systems  (Romanian,  Spanish,  Portuguese,  Belgian,  Latin 
America), as well as the German legal system. This system is opposed to the common law 
system. 
Although some authors believe that in this legal system there are two distinct groups 
[(a) the Latin group represented by Romania, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and (b) the Germanic 
group represented by Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, Switzerland), we agree with those who 
argue that, in fact, the systems “left from the same background, and they evolved differently 
depending  on  their  previous  customs,  religion,  culture”
15,  namely  the  common  legal 
background sprang from the reception of the Roman law. 
The name is conventional, “because a large number of national legal systems included 
in this area, can not find its origin in any of these two systems (i.e. Roman law and German 
law), but it represents the result of the legislation export practiced by states that once held 
colonial empires, like France, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy”
16. 
This legal family is characterized by the following features: it is a written law, based 
on a hierarchical system of sources of law, is codified and, knows a great division into public 
and private law, which determines the structure of its branches and institutions.  
By origin and characteristics, it is clear that Romanian law is part of the Roman-
Germanic law.  
This system has been criticized in the Doing Business reports published by the World 
Bank on the grounds that it would be less economically efficient than common law. In the 
2004,  2005,  2006  reports,  the  economists  concluded  that  French  law,  and  generally  the 
countries that are part of the civil law system are economically counterproductive, unlike 
common law. Of course that there were many reactions and counterreactions from the civil 
law lawyers. 
The common law family, the second largest legal system of our times, is originally 
from England and is opposed to the civil law system. While “Europe was separated from the 
British Isles by a slap of water, the legal communication was almost non-existent”
17, two legal 
systems developing in parallel and creating two different legal pools. Currently, this system is 
found in England, Ireland, USA (except Louisiana), Canada (except Quebec), Australia, New 
Zealand. 
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This system consists of three components: common law (judicial precedents), equity 
(rules of law given before the unification of the English courts by special courts, to mitigate 
the asperities of the common law rules) and statutary law (rules of law created by statutes). 
Equity represents a “corrective background brought to the common law, in so far as this law 
based on precedents loses ground, becoming unreceptive to social impulses. Given that equity 
became a parallel legal system concurrently with the common law and not infrequently in 
conflict with it, in 1873, it was established by a special statute that if a conflict between equity 
and common law arises, the former will prevail”
18. 
Among its features, we underline the following: written law has more lex specialis 
character, special structure, legal sources system, legal conceptualization and legal language 
are different from those of other families, legal branches are not structured due to the lack of 
division in public law and private law, law creation is not necessarily the result of the work of 
the legislator based on the legislative technique principles. In the “jurisprudence’s thicket”
19, 
the statute is a secondary source of law and its provisions are incorporated in the legal system 
of judicial precedents. 
The  differences  between  these  two  legal  families  are  well  established  in  the  legal 
doctrine. Even the concepts are different (e.g. the concept of fraud).  
It  is  interesting  that  English  law  does  not  recognize  the  implied  repeal  and  the 
desuetude, therefore many statutes which have been abolished, last for centuries. Thus, in 
order  to  facilitate  knowledge  of  the  statutes,  over  time,  collections  of  statutes  have  been 
compiled. 
Nowadays, we discover that many common law contractual techniques (e.g. know-
how contracts, factoring, leasing, franchising) penetrated the entire international law, which 
leads us to support the idea that in the near future “elements of interference between the two 
major legal systems will increase”
20. 
The “socialist” great system was born as a result of receiving more or less massive 
Soviet law in states with a political system like the Soviet Union
21. This system should be 
investigated especially because there are countries that have not abandoned the socialist 
political and economical system, although there is a trend towards the market economy. The 
ideology of the dialectical and historical materialism is the foundation of the “socialist” law. 
This  historic  law  inspired  by  the  Marxist  ideology,  has  disappeared  with  the  end  of 
communism  and  it  was  found  especially  in  the  eastern  countries  (e.g.  the  USSR  and  its 
satellites). Opposed to the capitalist law, the socialist law meant socialization of all means of 
production, their owner being the State or the political party , except for goods of personal 
use. Since the fall of communism and the USSR breakup, the socialist states adopted the 
Roman-Germanic legal system, with all the legal implications arising from this fact. 
The  “religious  and  traditional  legal  systems,  although  the  product  of  past  eras, 
adjusting sometimes with great difficulty to the modern social relations, govern hundreds of 
millions in the contemporary era”
 22. The religious origin of certain systems (Hindu, Islamic 
or Jewish) must not lead us to the conclusion that all legal norms are religious. Moreover, 
there is a tendency to modernize the traditional legal systems, although in the beginning, it 
was organically integrated in the religious doctrine of Islam, such as China, Japan and Turkey 
which have adopted fully modern legislation
23. 
In the category of religious and traditional legal systems, the  Muslim law has wide 
application in all Arab countries (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Afghanistan, Indonesia). In 
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the concept of Islam, the Muslim law is the fruit of the divine revelation, as a result of its 
rules revelation by God to the Prophet Muhammad, through the archangel Gabriel”
 24. 
Muslim law has several sources. The Qur'an is the holy book of Islam, comprising 
6,342 verses, 500 referring to law. Sunna is all that is attributed by tradition to the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Idjima  records  the  consensus  of  legal  counsels  on  legal  matters,  idjitihad 
representing the jurisprudence. Sharia of Islam are fundamental principles of Muslim law 
enshrining the right solutions for law branches. 
Specialists  in  Islamic  law  emphasize  that  today,  it  is  subject  to  reforms,  being 
modernized; this change is “a natural step, dictated by a rapidly changing world”
25, some 
countries resorting to codification, procedure or judicial organization.  
Hence the problem of adapting people moving from a Muslim country or in a Muslim 
country because that person may feel subject to inconsistent rights, Sharia and the civil law of 
the other country. 
Hindu law is a preservative law, not representing the Indian law, but the law of the 
community that adheres to Hinduism. It is based on the caste system, based on the four castes: 
Brahmins, Satria, Vaisala and Sudra. Therefore, in theory, India is also called “melting pot of 
legal systems”
26. 
Traditional Japanese law still has importance, because some principles and rules have 
been kept by the Japanese legislator in modern legislation adopted (e.g. the matter of persons 
and  family  relations)  or  provided  to  other  countries.  This  legal  system  was  inspired  by 
Chinese Confucianism, one of the sources of Shinto. Although for many centuries, Japanese 
regulations regarded the division of rice fields by the number of each family members (ritsu-
ryo  regulations)  and  the  formation  of  Japanese  feud  proved  as  inviolable  areas  (sh￳ 
regulations), we notice that with the blossoming of the samurai military caste (the twelfth 
century – to its members being applicable the customary law), the ritsu-ryo and sho rules have 
been abandonned. Like in China, “[i]nstea of the legal rules, in the society giri was acting, 
behaviour  rules  similar  to  the Chinese rites”
27, because ideas about  law  and justice were 
considered  to  disturb  the  social  peace.  Subsequently,  Japan  went  through  the  Meiji  era 
(roughly 1868-1912), when European legislation was received and the first legal codes were 
drafted, thus entering into the Roman-Germanic legal system. 
The African customary law has been described as a peasant law by the colonial powers 
who colonized Africa
28. We can not speak only about one system of law, because each ethnic 
community had its own customs. The African law was dominated by the tribal religion, wit h 
many  agrarian  rites, according  to  which  the earth is  divine  property  entrusted to  their 
ancestors, humans being only simple holders. This system of law was based on orality. It is 
interesting that orality was also applicable to the community head edicts, age castes or of the 
various associations that could legislate under an empowerment from the king or chief
29. This 
system of law was enriched by the colonial metropolis rules, therefore we find now in Africa, 
the common law or the civil law system. 
                                                 
24 Ion Craiovan, op. cit., p. 164. 
25 Mihail Albici, op. cit., p. 61. 
26 Mario Losano, Marile sisteme juridice. Introducere în dreptul european şi extraeuropean, All Beck Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2005, p. 421. 
27 Victor Dan Zlătescu, op. cit., p. 233. 
28 Ion Craiovan, op. cit., p. 166. 
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C.  The  legal  typology  based  on  the  law  role  as  a  social  organization  mean 
(Mattei) 
An interesting analysis in comparative law was made recently by the Italian researcher 
Ugo Mattei. Although Mattei entitled his study Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in 
the World’s Legal Systems, we believe it is a new conception of legal typology. Motivating his 
study on the need of transferring knowledge between different legal systems, he argues that a 
global taxonomy that would “allow legal systems to learn from each  other”
30. In a world 
where right is exported and imported, this kind of typologies is needed. 
The author stresses out that Ren￩ David’s legal typology should be revised because the 
world map is different nowadays. The first major difference is the fall of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe, which questions the socialist legal family. The second difference 
is the “success” of the same political system in China and thus “the increased importance of 
legal  sinology  among  comparative  disciplines”
31.  The  third  difference  is  the  increased 
importance and progress of Japanese law in the last decades. The fourth difference is related 
to the increasing consciousness in the Islamic world about cultural and legal particularities. 
The fifth difference is related to the independence of the states from the African continent. 
Thus Mattei proposes a new legal typology based on the role of law as a means of 
social organization in the Weberian sense, using the assumption that the most primitive social 
structure  is  a  legal  structure  so  that  the  existence  of  a  legal  order  is  independent  of  the 
presence of the legislator, magistrates and lawyers. The basic idea is that “in all societies there 
are  three  main  sources  of  social  norms  or  social  incentives  which  affect  an  individual’s 
behavior: politics, law and philosophical or religious tradition”
32. According to these sources, 
Mattei provides a tripartite scheme. He points out that every legal system assumes a plurality 
of legal patterns. Moreover, he stresses out that the legal systems are “the result of a layered 
complexity that stems from the accidents of legal history and from legal transplants”
33 - an 
interesting  example  being  the  Latin  American  countries  where  public  law  is  based  on 
common law, while private law on the continental law. These ideas lead to the idea, according 
to Mattei, that “the legal systems never are. They always become. And what determines the 
becoming is the variable role of different patterns within legal systems. Hence the difference 
between a patern and a system of law”
 34. 
The truth is that all three legal patterns are found in all legal systems of the world, the 
only difference being their share. This leads to the “hegemony” of one of the two remaining - 
of course they do not disappear, but they have a more blurred role. It is very interesting the 
example  of  Italy
35  offered  by  Mattei,  which  is  a  legal  system  classified  by  him  as  a 
professional one. 
On August 1
st, 1996, Italy was rocked by the acquittal of a Nazi criminal, Eric Priebke, 
by a court of Rome, and  later acquittal, the Minister of Justice (an eminent  professor of 
criminal law, professor Flick) ordered the police to arrest Priebke in order to stop people’s 
revolt. Clearly illegal  under the umbrella of the theory  of  rule of law, that decision was 
justified on the grounds of the extradition request made by Germany, being proved later that 
the  request  was  filled  after  the  Minister’s  order.  Even  arguing  that  he  was  aware  of  the 
intentions of the German authorities, his order was illegal because Article 716 of the Italian 
Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  only  attributed  this  right  to  prosecutors,  who,  in  Italy,  are 
                                                 
30 Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, no. 1/1997, vol. 45, p. 6, available at http://works.bepress.com/ugo_mattei/19/ (15.03.2014). 
31 Ugo Mattei, op.cit., p. 10. 
32 Ugo Mattei, op.cit., p. 12. 
33 Ugo Mattei, op.cit., p. 14. 
34 Ugo Mattei, op.cit., p. 14. 
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independent of the Ministry of Justice. In this case, it is an obvious example that politics had 
an advantage over the law, even if the political decision was contrary to the Italian court 
verdict. 
According to Mattei’s typology, national systems may belong to professional rule of 
law, political rule of law and traditional rule of law.  
Of  course  that  this  division  is  dynamic  because  legal  transplants  can  change  the 
direction of a national system, because of the influence of a predominantly legal pattern. The 
author does not deny the possibility that a legal system be part of two categories at once (e.g. 
family law related to traditional, while commercial law to professional and criminal law to 
politics). He stresses out that this division “in three major families of law allows considerable 
flexibility and recognizes clearly that classifying legal families is a means to better understand 
and not an end in itself”
36. 
Legal systems that fall within the rule of professional law entrusts major decisions (i.e. 
political decisions) to the political world (which must, however, comply with the law) and the 
decisions less important to the legal world. Legal systems that fall into this category are: 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain,  United  States  of  America,  Oceania,  Western  Europe, 
Scandinavia national systems, some “mixed” systems (Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, South 
Africa). The author doubts whether Israel and India should be placed here. Basically, there are 
states where the legal process is not very influenced by alternative social structures. Currently, 
this category is legitimized by democracy. 
The rule of political law requires that all political systems in this class cannot separate 
the legal process of the political process, since they are not autonomous. Political relations are 
crucial in these systems, being very important “who’s who” in the political world. From the 
need to preserve stability and power, governments in these countries do not respect the law. It 
is interesting to note that “when men rather than law govern, people usually find it more 
prudent to seek a powerful human protector than to stand on legal rights against the State”
37. 
In this category, the important and less important decisions are taken by the political power. 
This includes the vast majority of socialist law states except certain states (“maybe” Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic), the least developed countries in Africa and Latin America, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Islamic  states  in  northern  Africa,  as  well  as  Cuba.  The  author 
excludes from the list of socialist states China, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea, 
the former Soviet republics in Asia. 
The  rule  of  traditional  law  is  found  in  systems  where  law  and  religious  or 
philosophical tradition are not clearly delineated. In this category would fall the Islamic states, 
states that are governed by the Indian or Hindu law, other countries in Asia governed by 
Confucianism conceptions of law (e.g. China, Japan). 
D. The appearance of a new legal typology – the European Union law 
The analysis of the European Union law leads to the conclusion that we are in the 
presence of a particular type of law, different from the national law of the Member States and 
from the international legal system.  
Due to the sovereignty of the Member States, each State is entitled to determine the 
applicable law, with the feeling that this law must be designed at national level, as well as the 
national and social policy of the country. 
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EU law is a law under construction, evolving, not being “the incarnation of an eternal 
and metaphysical idea”
38. Certainly, the European Union is a progressive realization of a 
political project without precedent. 
The recognition of its own legal order means that EU legal norms form a complex 
structure  of  legal  norms  which  have  a  well-defined  set  of  legal  sources,  while  the  EU 
institutions  have  well-established  procedures  to  apprehend  and  punish  violations  and 
deviations.  
Moreover, the existence of the institutional law, substantive law and procedural law of 
the European Union confirms the existence of a new legal typology – the type of EU law.  
We also stress out that the procedural law of the European Union is not suspended, 
because  the  substantive  law  of  the  European  Union  exists,  and  although  it  is  somewhat 
disparate, it is not (yet) codified. 
Codification is a topic increasingly discussed, existing a growing concern regarding 
the contractual side. The realities of the past century have led to a desire to unify private law, 
like this being born the European contract law. The efforts of the doctrine “codification” were 
supported  by  the  EU  institutions  (e.g.  the  rules  of  harmonization  from  the  directives  on 
consumer protection, the uniform rules on cross-border contracts under Regulations Brussels I 
and  Rome  I,  the  resolutions  of  the  European  Parliament  on  European  contract  law,  the 
Common Frame of Reference. 
But we must not be tempted to believe that the desire to “codify” would only occur in 
private law, because we find first steps in criminal law (e.g. such as the European arrest 
warrant, the convention on drugs, the convention on trafficking in persons, the fight against 
money laundering, aspects regarding the use of European funds. 
Moreover, EU’s legal order is inherent, being independent of the international legal 
order and relatively independent of the national legal order of the Member States. 
Moreover, the EU legal order is integrated to the legal system of the Member States 
and it is imposed to their courts due to the direct, immediate and priority applicability of EU 
law. 
But  which  are  the  features  that  should  meet  European  Union  law  in  order  to  be 
considered a new legal typology?  
According to the legal doctrine, in order to discuss about a new typology in terms of 
legal theory, we should establish the existence of:  
1.  autonomous will to control the legal decision making; 
2.  fundamental principles steering the essential directions of erecting and developing the 
respective legal order. 
1. Autonomous will of the European Union 
EU’s legal will represents the very essence of the EU law. This autonomous will, 
which controls the legal decision making, should not be seen as the simple arithmetic sum of 
the individual wills of the Member States, but as a separate legal will. Precisely because of 
this, Nicolae Popa points out that the “European Union combines, in a specific dialectic, the 
supranational with national in an order with new qualitative determinations”
39, stressing that it 
is less important “the reference to classical types of social-state organization”. Therefore, the 
European Union is not just a sum representing the number of the Member States, but a whole 
having a stable structure and presenting distinct features in relation to the characteristics of its 
parts. This is normal, because we are talking about an Union, so the problem is the typical 
features, even if there are peculiarities. 
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According to the legal doctrine, the EU law is composed mainly of two types of legal 
sources: primary law and secondary law. The primary law includes the legal rules comprised 
in  the  founding  treaties  of  the  European  Communities,  as  well  as  the  conventions  and 
protocols  attached  to  the  founding  treaties,  the  amending  treaties.  The  secondary  law 
comprises the rules contained in the acts adopted by the EU institutions. However, there are 
also other specific sources of law, such as the unwritten legal rules applicable in the EU legal 
order: the general principles of law common to the legal systems of the Member States, the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the rules resulting from the EU’s 
external commitments or the complementary rules arising from conventional acts concluded 
by Member States in implementing the treaties. 
To this list of legal sources, Ion Craiovan adds another one - the national law, which 
sometimes, can be a source of the EU law by reference either express or implied. 
The European Union has a functioning legal status which allows it to fulfil its mission 
and to achieve its goals. In this sense, it is endowed with legal personality, enjoys privileges 
and immunities, and its decision making is very complex and well developed. 
Regarding the legal personality of the European Union, it is well known that before 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  only  the  European  Communities  had  legal 
personality (Article 281 TEC, Article 184 of the Euratom Treaty). Since then, the Union 
replaced and remained the successor of the European Communities [Article 1(3) TEU], the 
full  legal  personality  being  recognized  (Article  47  TEU).  It  is  a  limited  functional  legal 
personality, which exists only to help to achieve the objectives of the Union. This aspect is 
confirmed  by  Declaration  no.  24/2007  on  the  legal  personality  of  the  European  Union, 
annexed to the Final Act of the  Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The Conference confirms the fact that if the European Union has legal personality will 
not in any way authorize the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.  
The legal personality of the European Union is domestic and international. 
Based  on  the  text  of  Article  47  of  TEU  which  explicitly  recognises  the  legal 
personality of the European Union and of Article 335 TFEU (“[i]n each of the Member States, 
the Union shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their 
laws; it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be 
a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Union shall be represented by the Commission”), 
we notice that the European Union is thus treated as a legal person of public law, having its 
own  legal  personality,  distinct  from  that  of  the  Member  States.  We  find  interesting  the 
recognition of the internal legal personality of the Union, and not only of its institutions (even 
if the Commission is authorized by the above mentioned Article), because this recognition 
allows it to perform all acts necessary for its operation in each Member State (e.g. acquisition 
or alienation of assets,  conclusion of contracts, court appearances). Other institutions and 
bodies  of  the  Union  still  enjoy  a  legal  personality  distinct  from  that  of  the  Union  (e.g. 
European Investment Bank or the European Central Bank - Articles 308 and 282 TFEU). 
However, like the European Community, the European Union has  an international 
legal personality, even in the absence of any express mentioning in the treaties. The Court of 
Justice upheld in the A.E.T.R. judgment that independent of the powers expressly provided in 
the TFEU, the European Community (therefore, nowadays the Union!) is competent, even in 
the absence of express provision, to conclude external agreements in all areas in which the 
Community is competent to meet a specific objective according to the Treaty and in which the 
adoption of an international commitment appears to be necessary for achieving that objective. 
Thus, we can conclude that the EU is a subject of international law, having the right of 
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passive right of legation, being able to stand alone in court, with the possibility of entailing 
the  international  liability  and  concluding  international  agreements,  as  well  as  adopting 
economic sanctions or becoming member in international organizations. 
Just  because  it  has  a  special  legal  status,  the  European  Union  shall  enjoy  in  the 
territory of the Member States such privileges and immunities necessary for performing its 
mission. 
Union  shall  enjoy  in  the  territories  of  the  Member  States  such  privileges  and 
immunities necessary for the performance of its duties, according to the conditions laid down 
in the Protocol concluded on April 8
th, 1965 on the privileges and immunities of the European 
Union. The same regime applies in the case of the European Central Bank and the European 
Investment Bank. 
These privileges and immunities profits the members of the Union institutions and 
their staff, being fixed by the Protocol no. 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European 
Union, annexed to the Treaties. Among the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Union 
we  mention:  inviolability  of  premises,  buildings,  archives  and  official  communications, 
immunity execution, tax exemptions, customs exemptions.  
Unfortunately,  not  all  consequences  were  drawn  from  the  recognition  of  the  legal 
personality of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
2. Principles of the EU law 
The legal principles represent those guiding ideas, fundamental precepts that orientate 
the development and implementation of legal rules, either at the level of the whole legal 
system, or at the level of a law branch. The doctrine emphasizes that they are a factor of 
stability, adaptation and integration in the legal order, filling the legislative gaps, correcting 
excesses and anomalies in the moment of accomplishing the law. 
In legal theory, the principles of law are not addressed in terms of each state, such as 
the principles of the Romanian law, the principles of the Indonesian law, the principles of the 
Polynesian law, but about the principles of law, of any kind of law, regardless of space or 
time. 
In the complex process of development and enforcement of the EU law, the general 
principles of law occupy a very important place. The plurality of general principles of law is 
not  enshrined  in  the  EU  law,  but  in  some  cases  we  find  references  in  the  treaties.  The 
reference to these principles can only be made when the EU law is incomplete, because, if 
there are provisions in this regard, their application is mandatory. 
If  in  the  settlement  of  any  case,  the  Court  of  Justice  must  send  or  apply  general 
principles of law derived from the national legal order of the Member States or from the 
international legal order, the reference or the application may be made only if those principles 
“are compatible with the principles of the Community and with the specific of the legal order 
arisen from the Community texts”.  
As the general principles of the EU can make the object of a future extended research, 
we will not insist on their analysis in the present study. 
We shall only mention that the number of these principles is not agreed in the doctrine, 
since the European construction is in a continuous process of evolution, and that they can be 
divided into four main groups:  
  the public international law and its general principles inherent in any organized legal 
system (e.g. principle of legal certainty, general principles derived from procedural 
rights);  
  the domestic law of the Member States by identifying the general principles common 
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principle of access to legal procedures, principle of confidentiality between lawyer and 
its client);  
  the  EU  law  by  deducting  the  general  principles  derived  from  the  EU  nature  (e.g. 
principle of direct effect, principle of priority of EU law, principle of representative 
democracy);  
  the fundamental human rights (e.g. property right, freedom of speech and religion, 
principle of fair trial). 
III. Conclusions 
We have started our research from defining the term “typology”. We have also tried to 
emphasize  the  difference  between  “typology”  and  “classification”,  with  which  is  often 
confused.  Summarizing  the  above  said  in  this  regard,  the  classification  is  used  when the 
distinction between elements can be achieved by a single criterion, while the typology occurs 
when  using  multiple  criteria,  typologies  being  a  particular  form  of  systematization. 
Furthermore, the classification is complementary to division. 
Regarding the typologies, it is interesting that they have in common the fact that they 
fail to comprise all the variety of types. We cannot find the “pure type” in any typological 
system, especially that the idea of type is abstract, it is a mental construction that meets our 
logical desire to “order” natural phenomena which, by their nature, are not “ordered”. Thus, 
we will never find the perfect typologies. In order to achieve a real typology, it takes a lot of 
work synthesis. 
Moreover, Twining noted that today, “in a globalized, cosmopolitan world, even the 
general studies on law science and those of comparative law should become cosmopolitan, as 
a pre-condition for a revival of the general theory of law and a reconsideration in extenso of 
comparative law”
40. 
By  using  the  typological  method,  we  notice  that  a  legal  family  or  a  legal  system 
“represent the grouping of national legal systems, in relation to certain common features of 
them”
  41. Thus, each legal system knows the combination of typical general features with 
intrinsic ones. Of course that these have been marked by the social, economic and cultural 
conditions from each historical period. 
As previously mentioned, analysing the history of law, we distinguish the existence of 
overlapping systems of law, which raises the question of their typology.  
Unfortunately,  all  the  classifications  mentioned  in  this  study  show  that  the  legal 
systems typology is not entirely solved. As pointed out Leontin-Jean Constantinesco, “[t]he 
first  thing  that  hits  you  when  you  deal  with  this  problem  is  the  dilettantism,  superficial 
analysis or even the absence of any scientific examination of the matter. Comparatists who 
addressed this matter seem rather keen to demonstrate the flaws criteria proposed by other 
authors
42, being eager to propose their own classification, which does not really worth more”. 
There are several reasons we mention here: the lack of a serious examination of the 
issue regarding the legal systems classification, the fields examined in order to make groups 
were not determining, any partial and unfounded classification is necessarily false, the spread 
of civil codes in the world cannot represent a classification criterion, the heterogeneity of the 
proposed criteria. One of the most important reasons is the inability to provide the criteria 
necessary to the micro-comparison classification (being able eventually to obtain only micro-
results), macro-comparison being necessary. 
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Currently, we are witnessing a mutual forthcoming and influence of legal systems 
from all over the world, this fact being obvious right from the existence of the European 
Union, which gave rise to a new type of law - European Union law.  
Compared by Jacques Delors to an “unidentified political object”, the European Union 
is largely a sui generis construction, borrowing from different models of institutions. 
No matter how we perceive typologies, we note that, currently, they are widely used 
and  appreciated  together  with  classifications,  regardless  of  the  science.  Moreover,  some 
authors consider that typologies are a simplification. As a shaping or a theory, it is false by 
definition, modelling or theorizing, it is false by definition, using the contradiction. 
As A.-E. Bottoms stated, in the conclusion of a report presented to the Council of 
Europe, “we must recognize that a classification, whatever it may be, shall not necessarily 
entail all the richness of human individuality and there might be a risk very easily to create a 
distorted image of human overall and of his life in the community. Our classification work 
required to improve our knowledge will result in a failure if, in our effort to understand, we 
lose sight of these truths”
 43. 
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